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Judicial Control of the Riot Curfew
Urban riots were more numerous and costly during the past year
than ever before;' it is quite possible that they will be worse during
the current summer. Yet legislative programs to eliminate the social
ills underlying riots are proceeding at a painfully slow pace.2 Both a
cause and an effect of this delay has been an emphasis on the short.
run goal of quashing disturbances.8 Along with tanks and other ar-
maments, 4 the curfew5 is rapidly becoming one of the most popular
riot control devices in the government official's arsenal.0
1. THE REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMIssION ON CIVILt DISORDERS (advance
copy, Bantam ed. (1968) [hereinafter cited as RIOT COmbt'N REPORT] lists 164 disorders which
occurred during the first nine months of 1967. Id. 113. No tabulation of disorders In past
years was included. Other sources list fewer disorders in 1967, but confirm a pattern of
increase in the extent of rioting during 1967 as compared with previous years. E.g., Hear-
ings on Riots, Civil dnd Criminal Disorders Before the Permanent Subcomm. on Inestiga-
tions of the Senate Comm. on Government Operations, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, facing 15
(1967) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on Riots] (75 disorders in 1961, 21 in 1966 and 5 in
1965). There were a substantial number of disorders in the first and second week of April,
1968, following the death of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. The New York Times listed 110
cities which experienced racial violence during this period. N.Y. Times, Apr. 10, 1968, at 37,
col. 3. At least one disorder, in Orangeburg, S.C., occurred during the early months of
1968. See N.Y. Times, Feb. 10, 1968, at 23, col. 3.
The Senate Subcommittee on Investigation reported 84 deaths and 1,950 Injuries in tile
1967 riots it studied, as compared to 10 deaths, 467 injuries in 1966, and 36 deaths, 1,206
injuries in 1965. Hearings on Riots, facing 15. The Subcommittee estimated finandal loss
in 1967 at S664.5 million, compared to $10.2 million in 1966 and $40,150,000 in 1965. Id.
Because a number of cities surveyed did not provide estimates of financial loss, actual
losses from rioting in all cities in each year are likely to have been substantially greater.
In the aftermath of Dr. King's death last spring, the New York Times reported 46 deaths,
N.Y. Times, Apr. 24, 1968, at 30, col. 6, and $45 million in losses to uninsured property
alone, N.Y. Times, Apr. 13, 1968, at 13, col. 1.
Although the riots of the past several years were far more numerous and destructive,
there have been many racial disturbances, often including fighting between whites and
blacks, in the nation's history. Some, for example East St. Louis in 1917, Chicago in 1919,
and Detroit in 1943, were serious. See generally RIOT CoMM'N REPORT 206-35; A. I. WAsROW,
FROM RACE RIOT TO SIT-IN (1967).
2. Of numerous proposals made by the Riot Commission in the areas of employment,
education, welfare and housing, including the creation of 2 million jobs in the next three
years for the hard-core unemployed and a guaranteed annual income, see RIOT Combu'N
RFPORT 23-29, 410-83, only one of any substance, open housing legislation, had been en-
acted by Congress as of early July. The open housing bill itself, passed soon after fie
death of Dr. King, might not have been enacted if he had not been slain.
3. Hopefully the most extreme example was Mayor Richard J. Daley's April 15 in.
struction that Chicago policemen were "to shoot to kill" arsonists, to "maim or cripple"
looters, and to use Mace on children. N.Y. Times, Apr. 16, 1968, at 28, col. 3. Daley later
said that mail was running 10 to 1 in favor of his stand. Id., Apr. 21, 1968, § E, at 3, col. 1.
The United States Army has earmarked a dozen brigade-size (2,000 men) task forces for
special training in riot control, id., Apr. 24, at 1, col. 2, and has "stockpiled riot.control
gear in strategically situated depots . .. ready to airlift . . . to any city if the need
arises." Id., Mar. 2, 1968, at 16, col. 3.
4. Los Angeles was reported interested in the purchase of a 20-ton armored personnel
carrier which can carry 20 men in bulletproof safety, and can be equipped with a .30.
caliber machine gun, tear gas launchers, a smoke-screen device, chemical fire extinguishers
and a siren that can disable people with its sound. Detroit used five armored vehicles
during its riot last summer, and several of its neighboring counties have since purchased
similar vehicles. Chicago has opted for helicopters. N.Y. Times, Mar. 2, 1968, at 16, col. S.
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Because of their simplicity, curfews can be used in a thoughtless
manner at times when they can fulfill no valid governmental policy
and can aggravate the very conditions which cause riots. Furthermore,
curfews impose drastic limitations on individual liberty which are
foreign to a free society. The circumstances under which a curfew
may be imposed, its duration, and geographic scope must be subject
to dose judicial scrutiny.
I. Nature and Use of the Curfew
A. History
The imposition of curfews on entire urban populations is nearly
unprecedented in American history. Prior to its use in response to
rioting in Philadelphia and Rochester in 1964 and Watts in 1965, T
the only examples of general curfews which can be found are those
Virginia's state police ordered six armored cars costing $30,000 ead. SAT. EvE. Post,
Apr. 20, 1968, at 28.
5. A curfew is a law requiring persons to remain indoors during specified periods.
usually the night time. Ordinarily certain exceptions are permitted, although these may
vary from limited categories of official personnel performing essential functions to persons
engaged in "legitimate" or "reasonable" activity, e.g., coming to and going from work.
The greater the number of exceptions of the latter t)pe, the more a curfew becomes simply
the functional equivalent of a loitering statute.
6. On the basis of a tabulation derived from reports in the New Yorh Times, it ap-
pears that curfews were imposed in at least twenty-two cities last summer, although three
were applied only to juveniles. The cities were: Atlanta, Ga., Cairo, Ill., Detroit. Mich.,
Elgin, Ill., Elizabeth, N.J., Grand Rapids, Mich., Milwaukee, Wis., Mt. Vernon, N.Y.,
Newark, N.J., New Brunswick, N.J., New Haven, Conn., Peeskill, N.Y., Phoenix, Ariz.,
Plainfield, N.J., Providence, R.I. (juveniles), South Bend, Ind., S)Tacuse, N.Y., Tampa. Fla.,
Toledo, Ohio (juveniles), Waterloo, Iowa (juveniles), Wichita, Kan., and Wilmington,
Del. This figure is twice as large as the eleven reported by the Riot Commission. Rior
COMm'N REPORT 125, 169 n.80.
Curfews appear to have growm more popular after the summer. One was imposed in
response to February disturbances in Orangeburg, S.C. In the wave of rioting and feared
disturbances which followed the death of Dr. Martin Luther King, the device was im-
posed upon at least twenty-seven cities: Albion, Mid., Baltimore, Md., Chattanooga,
Tenn., Chicago, Ill., Cincinnati, Ohio, Detroit, Mich., Joliet, Ill., Kansas City, Mo.,
Memphis, Tenn., Mobile, Ala., Nashville, Tenn., Newark, NJ., Pine Bluff, Ark., Pitts-
burgh, Pa., Trenton, N.J., Washington, D.C., Wilmington, Del., Youngstown, Ohio, and
nine North Carolina cities-Charlotte, Concord, Durham, Goldsborough, Greensboro,
Greenville, Raleigh, Wilmington, and Wilson.
Most curfews have applied only during the night, although a few have begun in late
afternoon and Milwaukee's was imposed round the clock for a 26-hour period. They have
as a rule had very narrow, if any, explicit exceptions, generally allowing policemen, fire-
men, other important officials and newsmen to come outside.
Several cities have employed measures, somewhat analogous to curfews, limiting tie
permissible size of public gatherings. Last summer, Philadelphia, Pa., and Wilmington.
Del., proscribed crowds larger than twelve and ten respectivel)'. Philadelphia again (12)
and Pittsburgh (10) used crowd-control measures this spring. Moreover, in numerous
cities, bars, liquor and gun stores, gasoline stations, and other business establishments
-were closed or their sales retricted.
7. See N.Y. Times, July 29, 1964, at 1, col. I (Rochester); id., Aug. 31, 19 4, at 1. col. 5
(Philadelphia); id., Aug. 18, 1965, at 1, col. 2 (Watts).
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imposed on Detroit during its race riots in 19438 and in New Castle,
Indiana, in response to labor riots in 1956.0 There are no reported
decisions challenging these measures. A curfew in Portland, Oregon,
which made it unlawful to be on the streets between 1:00 and 5:00
a.m. "without having and disclosing a lawful purpose" was upheld
by the Oregon Supreme Court in 1949.10
Curfews have generally been directed at specific groups. There are
still a large number of juvenile curfews,11 although their validity is
an unsettled question about which the few state courts that have ad-
dressed the issue have differed.' 2 In the pre-Civil War era, some cur-
fews were imposed solely upon Negroes.' The most notorious curfew
is that imposed during World War II on Japanese-Americans in Cali-
fornia to prevent espionage and sabotage; the Supreme Court upheld
8. The curfew required that all persons not having important business, or going to
or from work, be off the streets and in their place of abode between 10 pan. and 6 an.m.
Places of amusement were closed from 9 p.m. to 7 a.m. See NATIONAL INST. OF MUNICIPAL
LAW OFFICERS REP., MUNICIPAL CURFEW FOR MINORS-INIODEL ORDINANCE ANNOTATFD (No.
99, 1943).
9. For a discussion of the New Castle rioting and the use of a curfew and other mena
sures taken pursuant to a declaration of martial law, see Note, Rule by Martial Law its
Indiana: The Scope of Executive Power, 31 IND. L. RI-v. 456 (1956).
10. City of Portland v. Goodwin, 187 Ore. 409, 210 P.2d 577, rehearing denied, 187 Ore.
430, 210 P.2d 586 (1949). The curfew appears more akin to a loitering statute than thoso
which have recently been employed. Moreover, the court limited its application even
further. Apparently disturbed because the ordinance, taken literally, shifted the burden
of proof to the defendant and specified no prohibited act other than presence on the
street, it interpreted the regulation to make nocturnal presence on the street unlawful
only if a person "has and by conduct discloses a purpose to violate a law other than the
ordinance." Id. at 431, 210 P.2d at 586. See also Note, Use of Vagrancy-Type Laws for Arrest
and Detention of Suspicious Persons, 59 Yale L.J. 1351 (1950).
11. No complete figures have been compiled on the prevalence of juvenile curfews In
America. However, a 1958 survey indicates that of 103 responding cities with populations
greater than 100,000, 57 had curfew ordinances in effect. See Note, Curfeu Ordinances and
the Control of Nocturnal Juvenile Crime, 107 U. PA. L. REv. 66, 68 (1958).
12. Neither the Supreme Court nor the lower federal courts have been presented with
a juvenile curfew case. Existing state authority is of little assistance in analyzing the con-
stitutional problems involved-the particular ordinances which were approved or rejected
do not contain many features which might meaningfully serve as significant points for
distinguishing the valid from the invalid regulatory measure. Compare Thistlewood v.
Trial Magistrate for Ocean City, 236 Md. 548, 204 A.2d 688 (1964), and People v. Walton, 70
Cal. App. 2d 862, 161 P.2d 498 (1945) (valid), with Alves v. Justice Court of Chico Judicial
Dist., 148 Cal. App. 2d 419, 306 P.2d 601 (1957) and Ex parte McCarver, 39 Tex. Crim,
448, 46 S.W. 936 (1898) (invalid). See also, Note, supra note 11, 107 U. PA. L. RLV. 66 (1958).
A fundamental basis of those cases which have upheld juvenile curfews is the right of
the state to subject minors to greater regulation than adults. See, e.g., Thistlewood v.
Trial Magistrate for Ocean City, supra at 557, 204 A.2d at 693-94, It is not clear after
In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967), that regulation on such a basis is as clearly acceptable as
the courts seem to have thought.
13. Montgomery, Ala., imposed such a curfew. See Note, supra note 10, 59 YALt L.J,
1351, 1354 n.12. A similar measure in Memphis, Tenn., prohibiting Negroes from the
streets after 10 p.m., was declared unconstitutional as applied to a free Negro In Mayor
of Memphis v. Winfield, 27 Tenn. 707 (1848).
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this as a valid exercise of the war power.' 4 Hawaii was placed under
another severe wartime curfew.15
B. Present Role 6
A curfew has several desirable features as a method of riot control.
It minimizes confusion by providing law enforcement officers and per-
sons in the curfew area with a rule which is easy to understand and
apply: no one may be on the streets. The successful curfew will help
prevent the development of a "carnival atmosphere," which leads many
citizens who are initially bystanders to join in rioting. The voluntary
compliance that can be expected from uncommitted potential riot-
ers may eliminate the crowds which feed a riot and which provide cover
for those individuals bent on destruction. Cities like Milwaukee in
which curfews seemed effective in quelling riots imposed them at an
early stage when potential rioters had not gathered in large numbers. 17
14. Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943); Yasui v. United States, 320 US.
115 (1943). The Supreme Court subsequently upheld even more drastic measures. See
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (orders forbidding Japanese-Americans
from living in certain areas); Ex parte Endo, 323 US. 283 (1944) (assuming the validity
of detention in Relocation Centers although ordering release after period of time had
elapsed during which loyalty could have been determined).
These cases have been strongly criticized. See, e.g., ten Brock, Wartime Power of the
Military Over Citizen Civilians Within the Country, 41 CAUF. L. Rrv. 167 (1953); RostoW,
The Japanese-American Cases-A Disaster, 54 YA.u L.J. 489 (1945); Dembitz, Racial Dis-
crimination and the Military Judgment: The Supreme Court's Korematsu and Endo De-
cisions, 45 COLUm. L. REv. 175 (1945); Alexandre, The Nisei-A Casualty of World War 1I,
28 CoRNTLL L.Q. 385 (1943).
The Supreme Court refused generally to review military discretion "in determining the
nature and extent of the threatened injury or danger and in the selection of means for
resisting it." Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 US. 81, 93 (1943). Among the unquestioned
military judgments was that regarding the likelihood of espionage and sabotage by per-
sons of Japanese heritage: "The fact that no sabotage has taken place to date is a disturbing
and confirming indication that such action will be taken." Korematsu v. United States.
323 U.S. 219, 241 n.15 (dissenting opinion of Murphy, J.).
15. A blackout and curfew began on the night of December 7, 1941. and continued for
more than two years, long "after it could reasonably be said to be necessary." J. AMrioxv.
HAWAII UNDER AmiY RULE 59 (1955).
16. For a discussion of the use of curfews during the past year, see note 6 supra.
17. Within several hours of an outbreak of rioting in Milwaukee late Sunday evening.
July 30, Mayor Henry Maier imposed a round-the-clock, city.wide curfew and called for
the National Guard. N.Y. Times, Aug. 1, 1967, at 1, col. 4. It was reported that there
were three deaths, approximately 100 injuries and relatively light property damage, al-
though economic loss caused by the curfew "mounted into the millions." Id., Aug. 4, at
12, col. 2.
A similar strategy was employed with some success in disturbances after the Milwvaukee
rioting. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Aug. 18, 1967, at I, col. 2 (Syracuse); id., Aug. 21, 1967, at 1,
col. 2 (New Haven). It seemed even more popular this spring. See, e.g., id., Apr. 5, 1963,
at 1, col. 8 (Memphis); id., Apr. 6, 1968, at 1, col. 8 (Washington); id., at 22, col. 7 (De-
troit); id., Apr. 7, 1968, at 1, col. 6 (Chicago); id., Apr. 8, 1968, at 1, col. 6 (Pittsburgh);
id., col. 8 (Baltimore); cf. id., Apr. 14, 1968, at 1, col. 2 (discussing new policy of restraint.
based among other things upon "use of ovenhelming law enforcement manpower" and
"imposition of curfews-up to 24 hours" in places of major violence).
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By contrast, in both Detroit and Newark, where curfews appeared to
have little effect last summer, the number of rioters had grown un-
controllably large before the measure was imposed.18
C. General Impact
However useful the curfew may be, the cost of imposing it is high.
Compared to the prospect of large numbers of troops patrolling a tense
area or responding to a minor incident, the curfew may, at first glance,
appear innocuous. In fact, it is far more drastic. The curfew is a new
rule of conduct, affecting the actions of people who would not violate
any other law, as well as those who would. By contrast, other antiriot
tactics, such as the use of troops, are law enforcement devices intended
to concentrate only upon the narrower category of persons who violate
other laws.
The extraordinarily wide and necessarily indiscriminate net cast by
a curfew will sweep large numbers of people into jail;10 many of those
arrested, particularly on the first night, will be innocent citizens who
did not receive notice of the curfew.20 Many more innocent people
18. In Detroit, where rioting began early on Sunday morning, July 23, a curfew was
not imposed until 9 p.m. that night. During the day, available police, assisted by the
National Guard, could not contain rioting, and a "Roman holiday" mood developed. N.Y.
Times, July 24, 1967, at 1, col. 6; id,, July 26, 1967, at 1, col. 7. In Newark, there were two
nights of disturbances before Governor Hughes, deploring the "carnival atmosphere,"
called upon the National Guard and declared a 10 pan. curfew. Id. July 15, 1967, at 1,
col. 7. In contrast to the rather small number of deaths and injuries in Milwvaukee, see
note 17 supra, the rioting in Detroit and Newark resulted in 66 deaths and more than
2,500 injuries. Economic losses were estimated at well over $500 million. See Library of
Congress, Riots, April 1 to July 21, 1967, at 10-11 (July 28, 1967) (Newark); Library of
Congress, Major Race Riots: July 19 to July 27, 1967, at 2 (July 29, 1967) (Detroit),
19. No comprehensive statistics are available on the number of arrests for curfew
violations during last summer or this spring. The Senate Subcommittee on Permalent
Investigations tabulated nearly 30,000 arrests for all riot.related offenses in its survey of
75 disorders during 1967. Hearings on Riots, facing 15. The Riot Commission reported
that 19 per cent of over 13,000 charges in 19 cities were for curfew violation, RtOr CONMM'N
REPORT 177 n.138. The New York Times estimated that there were close to 20,000 arrests
in disturbances during the week following the murder of Dr. King. N.Y. Times, Apr. 11,
1968, at 35, col. 1. The curfew accounted for more than 3,000 arrests in Washington
alone. Id., Apr. 14, 1968, at 61, col. 4.
The large influx of arrestees creates serious problems for the administration of justice.
See generally RiOT CoMm N REPORT 337-57. For a discussion of possible adjustments in
criminal procedure to deal with problems posed by riots, see Note, Riot Control, The
Constitutional Limits of Search, Arrest and Fair Trial Procedure, 68 CoLUm. L. RAm. 8i
(1968).
20, In Washington, for example, where a curfew was imposed beginning at 5:30 p.m.,
it was reported that it had "no immediate effect. Few, if any of the thousands on the
streets knew of its existence." N.Y. Times, Apr. 6, 1968, at 22, col. 5. The Rot Commis-
sion placed special emphasis in its discussion of curfews on the need to provide notice.
RiOT Comrm'N REPORT 525. Where there are not adequate provisions for notice, a successful
defense to prosecution for curfew violation may be developed because of the extraordinary
nature of the measure. Cf. Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225 (1957).
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will temporarily be deprived of their means of economic livelihood.
Furthermore, by its restrictions on movement, a curfew severely af-
fects the rights of entire neighborhoods to exercise the First Amend-
ment freedoms of speech, assembly, and association. Being out of doors
and free to move about are preconditions for the effective exercise of
these rights.21 While the Supreme Court has not explicitly considered
the right to free local movement, the harsh attitude which has been
taken toward loitering and vagrancy statutes seems to reflect implicit
recognition of its primacy.3 Other recent cases have increasingly recog-
nized the right to interstate -a and extranational travel.2 4 The First
Amendment considerations have not been discussed, but the Court has
repeatedly emphasized the fundamental nature of the right to free
movement2s
21. See Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 US. 500, 520 (1964) (Douglas, J., concurring):
"[F]reedom of movement is the very essence of our free society .... [qit often makes all
other rights meaningful-knowing, studying, arguing, exploring, conversing, observing and
even thinking. Once the right to travel is curtailed, all other rights suffer, just as when
curfew or home detention is placed on a person." Free movement can arguably be cassified
as a penumbral First Amendment right, protected by the Ninth Amendment as is the right
of privacy. Cf. Griswold v. Connecticut, 281 US. 479 (1965).
22. The concern primarily articulated by the Court in striking dowm such laws has
been the possibility of arbitrary or discriminatory enforcement resulting from the broad
discretion of law enforcement officers. Thus, in Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 382 U.S.
87 (1965), the Court overturned a conviction under an ordinance which might have been
applied so as to permit a person "to stand on a public sidewalk ... only at the whim
of any police officer." Id. at 90. There was no discussion in the majority opinion of a
right to presence on the streets or of travel, but the result of judicial exdsion of loitering
ordinances is nevertheless to make more effective the right to use the streets which has
been asserted in earlier opinions. See, e.g., Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 515-16 (1939); cf.
Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 544-52 (1965). To the extent that curfews have broad
exceptions for "reasonable" or "legitimate" activity or are in fact applied discriminatorily.
they may fall directly within the Shuttlesworth rationale.
For a discussion of the wide variety of constitutional arguments which may be available
to challenge the "mixed bag" of offenses of status or presence, including vagrancy, pros.
titution, addiction, disorderly conduct, curfew violation, and others, see Amsterdam,
Federal Constitutional Restrictions on the Punishment of Crimes of Status, Crimes of
General Obnoxiousness, Crimes of Displeasing Public Officers and the Like, 3 Crrss. LAw
BuLL. 205 (1967).
23. See United States v. Guest, 583 U.S. 745, 757 (1966). Earlier assertions of existence
of a right to interstate travel were based upon the Commerce Clause, Edwards v. California,
314 U.S. 160 (1941); national citizenship, id. at 178 (Douglas, J., concurring); Crandall v.
Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35 (1867); and the Privileges and Immunities Clause, Edwards v.
California, supra at 183 (Jackson, J., concurring); Tivining v. New Jersey, 211 US. 78,
97 (1908). See also Z. CHAEE, TnR E HumwA RiGHTs rN "ri Coxsrrrtro.v 184-86 (1956).
24. Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (196M); Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116
(1958); cf. Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1 (1965) (travel ban to Cuba held on the "weightiest
considerations of national security," id. at 16).
25. The Court has twice used the identical description: "Freedom of movement across
frontiers in either direction, and inside frontiers as well, was part of our heritage ....
[It] may be as close to the heart of the individual as the choice of what he eats, or
wears, or reads. Freedom of movement is basic to our scheme of values." Kent v. Dulles,
357 U.S. 116, 126 (1958); Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 505-06 (1964) (quoting
from Kent); cf. United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 757 (1966).
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II. The Power To Impose a Curfew
A. The Control of Extraordinary Power
In normal times, governmental regulation of the individual is based
upon and limited by the police power. 20 Drastic measures which may
be required by war, insurrection or natural disaster exceed the bounds
of usual police power; for such measures two traditional doctrinal jus-
tifications exist-the war power27 and the power to declare martial
law.28 The first power is virtually an exclusive prerogative of the fed-
26. Despite its shadowy and amorphous nature, the police power clearly has limits,
although the only areas in which the courts have recently imposed limitations In practice
are those where First Amendment or other fundamental rights are Involved. Cf. Griswold
v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). One judicial concern in placing limits on the police
power, which seems to render curfews legally doubtful, has been with broad measures
that have a rational regulatory function, but also inhibit the exercise of fundamental
rights. Where the legitimate end can be achieved by narrower means, courts have struck
down the unnecessarily broad measure. E.g., Aptheker v. United States, 378 U.S. 500 (1964),
Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960), Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939). Curfews are
inevitably broader than the evil-violation of other laws-at which they are aimed. Just
as inevitably, they stifle fundamental freedoms. Ordinary law enforcement methods, where
they have not been incapacitated by a riot or other catastrophe, are available as narrower
means of achieving the objective at which the curfew is aimed. Only when these methods
are not functioning should a curfew be considered valid.
27. Congress and the President have traditionally been given broad discretion in taking
action necessary for the conduct of war. See, e.g., Lichter v. United States, 334 U.S. 742
(1948) (recapture of excess profits realized on war contracts); Silesian.American Corp, v.
Clark, 332 U.S. 469 (1947) (seizure of alien property); Korematsu v. United States, 323
U.S. 214 (1944); Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U.S. 503 (1944) (rent control); Yakus v. United
States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944) (price control); Hirabayshi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943),
28. For discussion and analysis of the use of martial law in the United States, see C.
FAIRiAN, THE LAW OF MARTIAL RuIE (2d ed. 1943) [hereinafter cited as FAIRnMANI F,
WIENER, A PRACTICAL MANUAL OF MARTIAL LAW (1940) [hereinafter cited as WIENER]; R.
RANKIN, WHEN CIVIL LAW FAILS (1939). There is some confusion regarding the term martial
law because it has been used to describe a range of extraordinary measures from military
exercise of all governmental functions to use of troops, accompanied by comparatively
minor restrictions on liberty and property, while civilian control is retained over most
aspects of government. See p. 1568 infra.
The most drastic martial law measures have been employed by the federal government
in wartime. During World War II, the military exercised complete control in Hawaii. Sce
J. ANTHONY, HAWAII UNDER AR.iY RUr 13 (1955). The writ of habeas corpus was suspended
and civilians tried in military courts during the Civil War. See Ex parle Milligan, 71 U.S.
(4 Wall.) 2 (1866).
Martial law has been employed more frequently by states in dealing with domestic
violence, often in connection with labor disputes. In this context, it has generally been
limited to the use of troops and occasional restrictive measures, such as detention without
traditional procedural safeguards of persons who played a significant role in the disorder.
Situations in which extraordinary measures have been taken "only as to the preservation
of the public peace and order, not for the ascertainment or vindication of private rights,
or the other ordinary functions of government ... and no exigency required interference
with their functions," have been described as "qualified martial law," Commonwealth
ex rel. Wadsworth v. Shortall, 206 Pa. 165, 170-71 (1906). See generally F AIRMAN 45.47; R.
RANKIN, supra, 65-84, 114-36.
The confusion concerning martial law is heightened by the fact that the chief executive
is also the commander-in-chief. Thus, the traditional dividing line between civilian and
military authority, and hence between civil and martial law, is somewhat blurred. The
Governor's use of the National Guard or the President's intervention with federal troops
may be construed simply as action taken in support of, rather than in place of, civil
control. See FAIRMAN 30.
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eral government2 9 and requires the existence of a state of war. 0 Cases
on martial law, however, provide a body of law imposing standards for
judicial review of extraordinary peacetime exercises of governmental
power to control internal disturbances.
Eschewing the free form judicial analysis which. has been applied
to the police power,31 courts have inquired sharply into the specific
circumstances justifying extraordinary measures.3 2 In fact the basic def-
inition of martial law, "when the military authority carries on the gov-
ernment, or at least some of its functions,"-3 carries with it two implied
conditions for its use: civil government, or a part of it, must have
broken down; and the President or governor, as commander-in-chief
of federal or state military forces, must have intervened to establish
control. The leading modern case discussing martial law, Sterling v.
Constantin,34 examined the basic requirement of breakdown of civil
control. The Governor of Texas declared martial law and dispatched
state militia to certain oil fields with instructions to limit the produc-
tion of oil to prevent waste. He asserted that oil producers were in a
state of organized insurrection against the conservation laws. The pro-
ducers obtained a temporary restraining order from a federal district
court until a three-judge panel could be convened. The Governor,
acting under the proclamation of martial law, ordered the militia to
continue limiting production at the wells, despite the restraining order.
The Supreme Court rejected the claim that a governor could exclu-
sively determine the existence of a state of insurrection. It asserted that
situations in which state power overrode private rights were always
29. Exercise of the war power by a state, absent congressional consent, is limited to
situations where it is "actually invaded, or in such imminent Danger as will not admit of
delay." U.S. CONsr., art. I, § 10.
30. The application of war power in a domestic context would require a large, orga-
nized insurrection in which independence from the established government is declared.
See The Prize Cases, 67 US. (2 Black) 635, 666-67 (1862).
31. For a discussion of the unsatisfactory nature of First Amendment theory and the
bewildering variety of tests which have been and are employed in evaluating regulation of
fundamental freedoms, see Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment,
72 YALE LJ. 854 (1963). The results of the "reasonableness" test which is applied in other
areas is more comprehensible only because of the constant judicial deference to the
legislative and executive judgment.
32. See, e.g., Sterling v. Constantin, 287 US. 378 (1932); Ex parle Milligan, 71 US.
(4 Wall.) 2 (1866); Mitchell v. Harmony, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 115 (1851), and cases cited note
38 infra. But cf. loyer v. Peabody, 212 U.S. 78 (1909). In Moyer, the detention by the mili-
tary of the head of the Western Federation of Miners for two and one half months during
a labor dispute was upheld by the Supreme Court. It asserted that the governor's declara-
tion of the existence of a state of insurrection is conclusive of that fact and concluded that
"the ordinary rights of individuals must yield to what he deems the necessities of the
moment." Id. at 85.
33. FAmrAN 30.
34. 287 U.S. 378 (1932).
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subjects for "judicial inquiry." 5 Reviewing the findings of the district
court, the Court concluded that the situation could have been handled
by ordinary civil means3 6
Subsequent cases which applied the Sterling standard make clearer
the degree of emergency which courts demand. In two cases martial
law was declared after violence resulted from attempts by employers
to continue business operations during strikes at their factories. The
commanding officer of the National Guard ordered the factories closed,
and in each case the employers obtained injunctions against further
interference with their constitutional right to use their property, The
rationale was that such closings were unnecessary because less drastic
alternatives for insuring that the law was enforced had not been ex-
hausted or shown inadequate.3
Judicial intervention does not end, however, when the existence of
an emergency has been established. Once martial law is declared, "a
vast gamut of permissible measures, differing in kind as well as in
degree," 3s are available.
Where there are . . . disturbances, it may, and often does suffice
merely to make a display of force. If, however, the disturbance
has advanced to more serious stages, the commander of the forces
sent to maintain order will have to restrict circulation, establish
curfew hours, disarm those carrying weapons, and exercise com-
plete police powers in the affected area. From that point, grada-
tions in the ascendancy of military rule ... will readily come to
mind .. until finally total martial rule is reached, which involves
•.. also the operation of military tribunals for the trial and pun-
ishment of civilians within the area.a9
Just as the legitimacy of a declaration of martial law is judged by its
necessity, so specific measures can be employed only to the extent ne-
cessitated by the incapacity of civil control.40
35. Id. at 398.
36. Id. at 591.
37. Strutwear Knitting Co. v. Olson, 13 F. Supp. 384 (D. Minn. 1936); Wilson & Co. v.
Freeman, 179 F. Supp. 520 (D. Minn. 1959); cf. Powers Mercantile Co. v. Olson, 7 F. Supp.
865 (D. Minn. 1934) (same rationale used as in Strutwear and Wilson; however, fie court
decided that civil control had broken down, all alternatives had been tried, and martial
law was justified).
38. WIENER 18.
39. Id. See also FAIRMAN 45.
40. FAIRMAN 47; WIENER 18. The military is, however, accorded a "permitted range of
honest judgment," in selecting specific measures to restore order. Sterling v. Constantin, 287
U.S. 378, 399-400 (1932). The validity of specific terms of a curfew, such as its duration or
application to juveniles only, and of curfew analogs, such as crowd-control measures or
store closings, should be examined at this stage. Although application of a curfew over a
shorter period of time or use of a crowd-control measure rather than a curfew unqttestion-
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B. The Riot Curfew: Where Does It Fall?
The curfew's place among the range of martial law devices, its his-
toric and present use in emergency contexts, and its severe impact on
constitutional rights stamps it an extraordinary exercise of authority.
But though imposition of a curfew in the face of a riot looks like an
exercise of martial law, there were no declarations of martial law last
summer or this spring.41 Governors and city officials alike, apparently
relying upon the police power, enacted curfews pursuant to declara-
tions of states of emergency.
42
It is not necessary to attempt to specify a precise line between
the police power and martial law in an effort to affix a proper label
to enactment of a curfew. Courts require a clear showing of necessity
before they will permit martial law measures to be imposed precisely
because of the severity of their impact. Similarly, when a curfew is
ostensibly imposed under the police power-without a declaration of
martial law--courts ought to scrutinize the justification for its im-
position as closely as they examine the preconditions for martial law.
ably infringes individual liberties to a lesser extent than more drastic alternatives, the
deprivations caused by any of them are nevertheless substantial enough to justify testing
all by the standard of "strict necessity." Once an initial decision regarding the need for
some extraordinary measures has been established, the specific action taken can be assessed,
bearing in mind the greater scope of executive discretion allowed at this stage. Cf. EX parte
Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 126-27 (1866) (discussing permissible geographic scope of
martial law).
41. In fact, efforts were apparently made to disclaim the existence of martial laiv. See,
e.g., N.Y. Times, July 27, 1968, at 1, col. 8 (describing extraordinary actions in Detroit). The
leading commentators agree, however, that martial law can exist without formal declara-
tion. See FAAt.uN 30; WImNER 19-20.
42. All states provide governors with powers to act in various emergencies, although the
provisions vary greatly in degree of specificity. See generally Note, Constilutional and
Statutory Bases of Governor's Emergency Powers, 64 Micii. L. RE%. 290 (1905). Michigan's
statute, for example, specifically refers to riots and the use of a curfew. Mcu. CoNIP. L.,ws
ANN. § 10.31 (1967). New Jersey mentions neither in broad provisions defining emergency
and empowering the Governor to take necessary actions. N.J. StrA. AWN. App. A: 9.33.1,
9-45 (1966). Connecticut, by limiting the definition of emergency to natural disasters or
enemy attack, seems to have precluded reliance on its statute for establishment of a curfew
in civil disturbances. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 28-9 (1958). If curfews are treated as martial
law devices, arguments regarding authority to impose curfews are irrieleant, but if they
are evaluated as an exercise of police power, questions of delegation represent a potential
basis for legal challenge under state law.
The main examples of curfews imposed by governors were those in Newark and Detroit.
Most curfews were declared by mayors and other city officials. Inasmuch as mayors, unlike
governors, do not serve as military commanders-in-chief, they cannot technically impose
martial law. The typical situation is one in whicl a mayor has declared a curfew and
requested the National Guard from the governor to insure its enforcement. It is conceiv-
able, however, that a curfew, especially if applied to a restricted area before violence has
occurred, could be enforced by local troops without outside assistance. In either case, the
curfew's extraordinary nature makes use of the martial law standard most appropriate in
assessing its validity. Cf. note 26 supra. To the extent, however, that declaration of curfews
by mayors must technically be treated as an exercise of the police power, the same potential
legal pitfalls regarding proper delegation from city legislatures or directly from state
legislatures exist.
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Such a test of strict necessity would not immobilize law enforcement
officials. The Court in Sterling did leave open the possibility that mar-
tial law could be justified by a showing of "immediate or impending"
danger 43 of the development of a situation in which civil means of con-
trol would be inadequate. Thus, in applying the martial law standard to
a curfew, a court could allow a city to show the presence or clear im-
minence of an extraordinary situation as adequate justification for a
curfew. But courts must insist that the city or state official responsible
for the curfew bear a heavy burden to justify it.
III. The Test Applied
A. Preventive Curfews
Even under a test of strict necessity, society's interest in restoring
order and limiting the loss of lives and property justifies the use of a
curfew as a response to a riot which has already begun. The success of
curfews in riot control has led cities also to impose them in anticipa-
tion of rioting as preventive measures. The experience of last summer
and this spring indicates that curfews seem most successful when im-
posed at an early stage in the rioting.44 Yet if a city waits until a riot
has begun, much damage will have been done before personnel can
be organized to make the curfew effective.46 By use of a preventive
curfew government officials hope to foreclose the possibility of a riot
and eliminate damage entirely.
If one could reliably predict when a riot is going to occur and be
certain that the curfew would prevent it, society's interest in main-
taining order would override the temporary costs to individual liber-
ties caused by preventive curfews. It is never clear in advance, how-
ever, that a riot is going to develop. The precipitating event may be
minor or major, planned or unplanned, endogenous or exogenous.
Even after the fact, it is difficult to determine why a particular incident
in a particular city prompted an outbreak.
46
There is also uncertainty concerning the effects of a preventive cur-
43. 287 U.S. 378, 401 (1932), quoting Mitchell v. Harmony, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 115,
146-47 (1851).
44. See notes 17, 18 supra.
45. The Riot Commission reported that in most disorders "violence generally flared
almost immediately after the final precipitating incident. It then escalated quickly to its
peak level, in the case of one-night disorders .... Nineteen of the surveyed disorders lasted
more than one night. In 10 of these, violence peaked on the first night . RIOT COMMt'N
REPORT 123.
46. See id. 117-18.
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few, which may run counter to sound antiriot policy. 47 First, for those
ghetto dwellers not so hesitant about violent behavior, the restrictions
of such measure may trigger expectancy into action. Secondly, to many
essentially nonviolent ghetto residents such a curfew may appear un-
justifiable and harsh, particularly on hot summer evenings. While such
persons might agree with and obey a riot curfew, they may join readily
in massive violation of a purely preventive measure, thereby helping
to create the large crowds from which a riot can quickly develop.
The uncertainties regarding prediction and effect may prevent some
of the potential abuses of curfews. Even government officials who are
totally insensitive to civil liberties will hesitate to risk the counter-
productive effects of a summer-long curfew in the hope of preventing
what could begin on any summer day. When faced with a situation
in which he fears rioting more than usual, however, an official may
prefer to err on the side of safety and impose an unnecessary curfew.
This appears to have been the response of several cities in the after-
math of Dr. Martin Luther King's assassination. 8 It is not difficult to
foresee a spate of preventive curfews throughout the country during
other tension-filled periods, such as when several major riots occur at
approximately the same time.49
Essentially similar to a preventive curfew imposed in anticipation
of an initial outbreak is the continuation of a curfew after rioting has
47. Cf. J. Spiegel, The Media in the Riot City 14-16 (paper prepared for the Lemberg
Center for the Study of Violence, Brandeis University, 1967) (discussing potentially adverse
results from overreaction to rioting).
48. Although it is difficult on the basis of newspaper accounts to conclude definitely
that the resort to a curfew was precipitous, it appears that at least three dries ustd them
as preventive devices during this period. Detroit responded to scattered looting with an
8 pan. to 5 am. curfew, which was continued through the weekend, although "no riot
[developed] in the city." N.Y. Times, Apr. 7. 1968, § 2, at 63, col. 6. In Memphis. Tenn.,
where a curfew had been imposed the week before as a result of rioting in connection
with a sanitation workers' strike, the measure was reimposed on Thursday, the night of
Dr. King's death. Id., Apr. 5, 1968, at 1, col. 8. There were no reports of rioting then or later.
A curfew was also placed on Mobile, Ala., Friday night in response to "sporadic" vandalism
Id. Apr. 8, 1968, at 31, col. 4. Some of the nine curfews which were imposed on North
Carolina cities after Dr. King's death may also have been preventive. It was reported that
Greensboro and Raleigh were "focal points" of violence. Id., Apr. 7, 1963, at 63, Col. 7. No
details were provided regarding the reason for curfews in the other cities. See id., Apr. 9,
1968, at 36, col. 7.
The crowd-control ordinances employed by Philadelphia both last summer and this
spring, see note 6 supra, also appear to have been preventive in nature. See N.Y. Times,
Apr. 9, 1968, at 27, col. 3; id., July 29, 1967, at 11, col. 1.
49. During the latter part of July 1967, the two worst riots of the summer occurred,
Newark and Detroit. Rioting began in Newark on July 12. Id., July 13, 1967, at 1, col. 2.
The National Guard began to withdraw on July 17. Id., July 18, 1967, at 1, Col. 4. Detroit's
riot began July 23. Id., July 24, 1967, at 1, col. 6. It appeared to be ending on July 27. Id..
July 28, 1967, at 1, col. 6.
More than 60 per cent of the 164 disorders reported by the Riot Commission occurred
during July. RIoT Com'N REPoRT 114.
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subsided. Here the likelihood of abuse is greater still,50 for added to the
impulse to err on the side of safety is inertia.
The strict necessity test drawn from the martial law analogy means
that government officials imposing curfews must be prepared to show
imminent danger of a breakdown of civil control. The enormous dif-
ficulties of predicting a riot and pinpointing the time of a return to
normal, compounded by the potential for terrible losses to life and
property, indicate that considerable indulgence must be given to exec-
utive discretion. A curfew should seldom be enjoined before the first
feared night has passed; to prevent clear abuses it should be sufficient
at this stage to require the government to file affidavits which present
a justification for the extraordinary measure. But as nights without
rioting pass, the court's responsibility to protect fundamental liberties
requires it to intervene unless officials can show a clear trend of in-
creasing tension and danger.
B. Geographic Scope
Once it has been decided that a curfew is justified, its permissible
geographic scope remains in question. When only selected areas of a
city fall under a curfew-black ghettos, for example-a court must
be careful that it is not faced with a case of discriminatory law enforce-
ment. From the point of view of the strict necessity test, however, the
interesting question concerns the validity of city-wide curfews.51
For purely preventive reasons, an official is justified in placing a
curfew upon areas of the city to which a riot may spread;52 but lie may
50. It is as difficult on the basis of newspaper accounts to designate cities which have
abused the curfew by maintaining it too long as it is to designate those which have im-
posed it prematurely. However, there appear to be some relatively clear examples. Last
summer, Milwaukee, which imposed a curfew on July 30, maintained it until August 6
although there was little disturbance after the second day. See N.Y. Times, Aug. 7, 1967,
at 22, col. 5. Detroit initially lifted its curfew after the fourth day, but reimposed It to
prevent sightseers from entering the riot area. Id., July 28, 1967, at 1, col. 6. It was not
finally lifted until nine days after it had originally been declared. Id., Aug. 2, 1967, at 16,
col. 5. In Trenton, New Jersey, this spring, a curfew was imposed on Tuesday, April 9. It
was continued through the weekend although there was no violence after Tuesday and the
National Guard was withdrawn on Friday. Cf. id., Apr. 13, 1968, at 11, col. 8. Washington's
curfew may also have been employed longer than necessary. The curfew was first imposed
on April 5. Id. Apr. 6, 1968, at 1, col. 8. Although it was reported as early as April 8 that
the rioting was ending, see id., Apr. 8, 1968, at 1, col. 6, the curfew was not finally lifted
until April 12. Id., Apr. 13, 1968, at 13, col. 3.
51. Among those imposing city-wide curfews have been Detroit, Milwaukee, Newark
(though originally only applied to one-third of the city), Syracuse, and Wilmington, Del.
last summer and Baltimore, Chicago, Detroit, Kansas City, Mo., Memphis, Nashville,
Pittsburgh, and Raleigh this spring. Only a few cities, including Atlanta, Phoenix, and
Tampa, tailored their curfews to a limited geographic area last summer. Apparently
only Newark used a geographically limited curfew this spring.
52. The Riot Commission recommended that curfew legislation be drafted to "enable
curfews to be imposed in adjoining cities in order to ensure coverage of the entire disorder
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also have a variety of reasons for wishing to impose a comprehensive
curfew which will reach dearly identifiable areas in which the likeli-
hood of extraordinary violence is nil. For example, (1) giving adequate
notice of the boundaries of a limited curfew will be more difficult
than notice of a general curfew; (2) assigning police or National
Guardsmen to cordon off a restricted area may subtract more person-
nel from the riot area than would policing a general curfew; (3) in
many unthreatened areas a city-wide curfew may be policed by fewer
men than are ordinarily needed for general law enforcement, thus
freeing others for duty in rioting areas; (4) the apparent discrimination
inherent in limiting a curfew to black neighborhoods may aggravate
the racially based bitterness which feeds most riots.
As early as Ex parte Milligan the Supreme Court established that
martial law must be limited to the geographic area in which it is neces-
sary.a3 This principle presumptively forbids the use of a curfew in
those portions of the city where there is no rioting or imminent dan-
ger of breakdown of civil control; considerations of administrative
efficiency alone cannot justify imposition of a curfew on nonriot areas
any more than they could justify a curfew when no riot threatened
the city at all. A city-wide curfew covering unthreatened areas is jus-
tifiable only to the extent that failure to take advantage of tie result-
ing administrative efficiencies can be said to jeopardize seriously the
effort to put down or control the present or expected riot. The dif-
ficulty of calculating such effects and the institutional problem of judi-
cial attempts to designate specific curfew bounds suggest that exec-
utive discretion will be given greater scope as to geographic limits
than as to imposition or continuation of a curfew." Nevertheless, the
strict necessity test imposes on courts a duty to prevent clear abuses by
requiring officials to present, as time passes, increasingly articulated and
convincing justifications for the geographic scope of curfews.
area." RiOT Cosrss'N REPORT 525. It did not define "entire disorder area," although the
reference may have been to the large riots in Detroit and Newark which spread to neigh-
boring communities. The Commission unfortunately did not parallel its concern for pro-
viding legislation that would make curfews broad enough geographically by suggestions
regarding the need to take care that curfews are not too broad.
53. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866). The Court held military trial of civilians in Indiana illegal
because dvil courts were capable of functioning. In that area, there was at best a
"threatened invasion." Martial law could be valid only where there was an "invasion ...
such as effectually close[d] the courts and depose[d] the civil administration." Id. at 127.
54. Especially on the first night, when manpower shortages are likely to be acute, an
official may be justified in imposing the curfew city-wide in order to concentrate manpower
in riot areas. In addition, there may at first be substantial uncertainty regarding where
further outbreaks are likely. The official may conclude that immediate danger compels
him to employ the simpler and quicker expedient of a possibly overinclusive measure.
As time progresses, however, resulting in availability of more men and dearer knowledge
of areas of danger, this argument for a city-wide curfew becomes less convincing.
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